Philia Relationships and Greek Literature

This chapter provides an overview of the role of *philia* relationships in tragedy (sections 3 and 4) and contrasts the importance and prevalence of this pattern in tragedy with its absence or lack of emphasis in epic (section 2). First, however, section 1 contains a brief discussion of *philia* in Aristotle's *Poetics* and of *philia* relationships in Greek society generally.

1. *Philia* in Aristotle and Greek Society

"When the *pathê* take place within *philia* relationships, for example, when brother kills or is about to kill brother, or does something else of this kind, or when son does this to father, or mother to son, or son to mother, these things are to be sought" (*Po.* 1453b19–22). In discussing plot patterns in tragedy, I begin with Aristotle's explicit statements in the *Poetics* about *philia*, *pathos*, and recognition.[1] Aristotle does not define *philia*, but he frequently mentions it in connection with *pathos* (for example, in the passage quoted above) and, in the passages cited in the next paragraph, in connection with recognition. He defines *pathos* as "a destructive or painful event [πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά], for example, deaths vividly represented, and great pain, and wounds, and all things of this kind" (*Po.* 1452b11–14). *Pathos* is one of the three parts of the tragic plot. Aristotle's account in chapters 10 and 11 implies that *pathos*, unlike recognition and reversal, is part of all tragic plots, simple as well as complex. Although a tragedy may have more than one *pathos*, the major *pathos* is an important event in the plot, one that arouses pity and fear and has important consequences for the good or bad fortune of the dramatic figures.

Recognition, in Aristotle's account, is closely connected with both *philia* and *pathos*. In the best plots, *philos* harms *philos*, or is about to do so, in igno-

rance of the relationship. Recognition either occurs after the act, as happens in Sophokles' *Oedipus the King*, or it prevents the act from occurring, as in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris* (*Po.* 14). According to Aristotle, then, there are four basic plot patterns (14.1453b27–54a9): (1) the act may be done by those who know of their *philia* relationship, as happens in Euripides' *Medea*; (2) it may be done in ignorance of this relationship, with recognition of *philia* coming after the act, as occurs in Sophokles' *Oedipus the King*; (3) the action may be about to occur but be prevented by recognition, as happens in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*; (4) someone may be about to harm a *philos* with knowledge of the relationship, but fail to act, as happens when Haimon in Sophokles' *Antigone* tries to strike his father but misses. Such events in themselves arouse pity and fear, even without being staged (14.1453b1–7).

According to Aristotle's definition, "Recognition is . . . a change from ignorance to knowledge, either to *philia* or to enmity, of those marked out for good or bad fortune" (*Po.* 1452a29–32). It is important not to confuse what Aristotle terms "recognition to *philia* or to enmity" (ἀναγνώρισις . . . ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν), that is, recognition leading to a state of *philia* or enmity, with "recognizing *philia*" (ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν: 1453b31). In the case of Oidipous, Aristotle's example of "recognizing *philia*" (1453b30–31), Oidipous recognizes that Iokaste and Laios are his parents. On the other hand, "recognition to *philia* or to enmity" must involve more than knowledge of identity. Since harm to an enemy does not arouse pity in the best way (1453b17–18), recognition of the identity of an enemy plays no role in Aristotle's theory of tragedy. Unlike simple recognition of identity, then, "recognition to *philia* or to enmity" is the realization that one is in a state of friendship or enmity with one's *philoi*, because one's actions are, were, or will be those of a friend or enemy. For example, Orestes discovers that Iphigeneia is his sister (recognizing *philia*) and that she is ready to act as his friend (recognition leading to a state of *philia*), but Oidipous finds out that he has acted as an enemy to his own kin (recognition leading to a state of enmity).

The *philoi* in Aristotle's examples are all close blood kin—parents, children, and siblings—and some scholars, for example Gerald Else, hold that Aristotle excludes non-kin relationships.[2] In the case of *pathos* also, Aristotle emphasizes death and physical pain. However, there is good reason to hold that his examples of both *philoi* and *pathê* are paradigmatic rather than restrictive. In defining *pathos*, he writes, "for example . . . and all things of this kind" (1452b12–13), and in giving examples of the best tragedies, he states, "for example . . . or does something else of this kind" (1453b20–22). This suggests that other kinds of relationships and events would count as instances of *philiai* and *pathê*.

Evidence that events other than death and woundings count as *pathê* is provided by the fact that Aristotle cites the *Hellê* as an example of the best kind of plot, one in which a *pathos* between *philoi* is prevented by recognition. In this play, "son, being about to hand over [ἐκδιδόναι] his mother, recognized her" (1454a8).[3] Since the *pathos* here is not murder with one's own hand but

betrayal to an enemy, failure to protect a *philos* or suppliant would seem to count as a *pathos*. Another category of *pathos* would include sexual acts. Rape is a painful and socially destructive act that occurs or is threatened in a number of plays. For example, in Sophokles' lost *Tereus*, mentioned by Aristotle at 1454b36–37, Philomela reveals by means of a woven picture that she was raped by her brother-in-law Tereus, who then cut her tongue out to prevent her telling what he had done. It is reasonable to count not only the wounding but also the rape as a *pathos*, especially since it is so central to the story. It also makes sense to count Oidipous's incest as a *pathos*. This act is not physically painful, but it is destructive (φθαρτική), in a social and religious sense, and in fact it directly causes Iokaste's suicide. Moreover, Oidipous's relationship with Iokaste is explicitly said to be central to the reversal of the *Oedipus*, in which the messenger comes "to free Oidipous from his fear concerning his mother" (1452a25–26). The incest would also count as a *pathos* because it causes ὀδύνη in the common sense of "pain of mind" (LSJ s.v. ὀδύνη 2), as do other terrible acts among *philoi*. For example, Pelias is said to have died in the "most painful" (ἄλγιστον) way, because he was killed by his own daughters (Eur. *Med.* 486–87).

There are also reasons to believe that *philia* in the *Poetics* includes more relationships than Aristotle's paradigmatic examples of siblings, parents, and children. Aristotle divides all human relationships into only three categories—that of *philoi*, enemies, and neutrals (1453b15–16)—and he uses the plural in stating that the best *pathê* take place "within *philiai* relationships" (ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις: 1453b19). Greek kinship included many more blood relationships than those within the modern "nuclear family." In fact, the Greek concept of kinship (*ankhisteia*) included relatives to the degree of children of cousins.[4] In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle notes the similarity between the relationship of cousins and that of brothers, and he draws no strict line between more and less distant relationships (1161b35–1162a1–4). In many tragedies—for example, Aiskhylos's *Suppliants*—cousinship or descent from a common ancestor is represented as a strong claim to kinship. All of this gives us reason to believe that *philia* in the *Poetics*, as in Aristotle's other works, includes a wide range of blood relationships.[5]

Tragedy also represents *pathê* between spouses and *xenoi*, and between suppliant and supplicated. Which of these, if any, would count as *pathê* among *philoi*? Although Aristotle does not mention spouse murder in his discussions of the house of Atreus, it is reasonable to count Klytaimestra's murder of Agamemnon (referred to as an attack on *philoi* in Ais. *Ag.* 1234–36) and Deianeira's poisoning of Herakles as the killing of a *philos*. Even though spouses are not usually blood relatives, they are an integral part of the household (οἰκία), and at *Poetics* 1454a12, Aristotle writes of households in which terrible deeds occur. It is less likely that the text justifies the inclusion of *xenoi* and suppliants as *philoi*. The *Poetics* is silent on these categories of relationships, as it is on marriage, and *xenoi* and suppliants are not part of the household. On the other hand, Aristotle's concept of *philia* is much broader in his

ethical works. For example, *NE* 8.12 lists three categories of *philia* relationships: community *philia* (κοινωνική), including *xenia*; companionship *philia* (ἑταιρική); and family *philia* (συγγενική), which includes the marriage relationship.[6] The ethical works also include self-love as a kind of *philia* (*NE* 9.4 and *EE* 7.6–7). Aristotle's broad concept of *philia* in these works gives some support to an interpretation of the *Poetics* according to which *philia* is centered on, but not restricted to, blood kinship. In the *Poetics* Aristotle stresses the closest blood kin—parents, children, and siblings—not because *philia* is limited to blood kinship, but because this kind of relationship is exemplary and paradigmatic of *philia*. Just as in the *NE*, he leaves open the possibility that *philia* can be extended inwards, to include one's relationship with oneself (self-love), and outwards, to include more distant relations such as cousins and spouses, suppliants, and *xenoi*.

In any case, Aristotle's views merely serve as a useful starting point. It is fruitful for a study of Greek tragedy to adopt broader concepts of *philia* and tragic recognition than the text of the *Poetics* explicitly warrants. According to the broader view adopted in this study, the *philia* relationships within which *pathê* take place in the best tragedies include not only close and more distant blood kinship, but also the formal reciprocal relationships of marriage, *xenia*, and suppliancy. Recognition, in turn, is not limited to the treatment of blood kin as *philoi*, but includes the acknowledgment and acceptance of outsiders as parties to these reciprocal relationships. This broadening of the concept of *philia* makes sense, because marriage, *xenia*, and suppliancy are all formal relationships involving reciprocal rights and obligations and are in many ways similar to blood kinship. These are, in John Gould's words, "social institutions which permit the acceptance of the outsider within the group and which create hereditary bonds of obligation between the parties."[7] To include formal reciprocal relationships as well as biological kinship is not only useful for a study of Greek tragedy, it is also consistent with Greek ideas about *philia*. Biological kinship normally also involves positive reciprocity; moreover, formal non-kin relationships initiated and maintained by acts of positive reciprocity—marriage, *xenia*, and suppliancy—are assimilated in turn to kinship in Greek thought.[8] On the other hand, it is reasonable to exclude from the relevant *philia* relationships those between *philoi* who are merely "friends" outside of these biological and reciprocal relationships.

Blood kinship differs from relationships initiated by reciprocal acts in that people do not choose their blood kin and may even be ignorant of the identity of their kin. However, because biological kinship is in most cases also a social relationship, it can be strengthened by acts of positive reciprocity or weakened by negative reciprocity. That Aristotle is concerned with the social aspects of biological kinship (the kind of *philia* represented by the paradigmatic examples in the *Poetics*) is apparent not only in the ethical works, but also in his definition of recognition in the *Poetics*, discussed above. In the paradigmatic cases, "recognition [leading] to [a state of] *philia* or to [a state of] enmity" is not merely the attainment of cognitive knowledge of the identity of one's biological kin ("to recognize *philia*"), it also involves acting as a *philos* or enemy. Because recognition leading "to [a state of] *philia*" is the acknowledgment of another as someone toward whom one has obligations of positive reciprocity, people may "become *philoi*" even when they are already *philoi* in the sense of biological kin. On the other hand, recognition leading "to [a state of] enmity" involves the discovery that one has acted as an enemy to one's biological kin. Reciprocity, then, plays a central role in the social relationships of blood kin, as it does in all kinds of *philia*.[9]

Of the three reciprocal relationships, marriage is closest to blood kinship. Although the bride retains important ties to her family of birth and is "foreign" (ἀθνεία) to her husband's family, spouses are members of the same household.[10] And although spouses are not usually blood kin, their relationship is like kinship in having its basis in "nature" (*NE* 1162a16–17). Moreover, marriage leads to an indirect biological tie between two spouses after children are born. As well as being a "natural" relationship, marriage creates important reciprocal relationships not only between the individual spouses, but also between their two families, who exchange gifts and services.[11] Homer's Alkinoos says that "father-in-law and brother-in-law are nearest after one's own blood and race" (*Od.* 8.582–83). On the negative side, conflicts may take place between spouses and in-laws, and tensions can arise when one man has children by two different women. When a man keeps a concubine, as well as when he has a legally bigamous household, the birth of children with the same father and different mothers (*amphimêtores*) is an important cause of tensions within the household (amphimetric strife) as mothers and children compete with one another for legitimacy, favors from the father, and recognition by the polis. In similar ways, tension is created by the presence of stepchildren.[12] This kind of conflict does not occur in Homer, but it is important in tragedy, for example, in Euripides' *Hippolytus*, where Theseus's bastard son Hippolytos lives in the same household with his legitimate wife and her children.[13]

Although *xenia* and suppliancy are less close to blood kinship than is marriage, both are relationships that are "expressed in terms of the language of kinship."[14] According to Homer, "a *xeinos* and a suppliant are like a brother to a man" (*Od.* 8.546–47). *Xenia* in the sense relevant here is a formal, hereditary relationship of "ritualized friendship" initiated by specific actions.[15] The *xenos* in this sense differs from both the stranger toward whom one has no obligations and the temporary guest or host toward whom one has only temporary and limited duties.[16] Not every gift exchange or instance of hospitality establishes formal *xenia*. The exchange between Hektor and Aias in the *Iliad* is merely a token of temporary cessation of fighting,[17] and the reception of Priam by Akhilleus does not make them *xenoi*, as is clear when Hermes warns Priam not to sleep among "enemy men" (*Il.* 24.683–84).[18] *Xenoi* have many of the same reciprocal obligations toward one another that blood kin do, including the giving of mutual aid and acting as foster parents for each others' children.[19] On the other hand, reciprocity is essential to *xenia* in a way in

which it is not to blood kinship. Kin may fail to keep their obligations and still remain kin, but *xenoi* must engage in reciprocal benefits if they are to become and remain *xenoi*.[20]

Supplication, of course, may take place within an already existing *philia* relationship. The kind of supplication with which I am most concerned here, however, is that which seeks either to initiate a *philia* relationship where one did not previously exist at all, or to gain for the suppliant acknowledgment as a *philos* on the basis of a previous relationship that was dubious or tenuous (for example, distant kinship). This kind of supplication is *hiketeia* in the etymological sense of supplication by an "arriving stranger" (*hiketês*). Suppliancy, like *xenia*, is a reciprocal relationship, although this is not so obvious to us. A suppliant always has obligations to reciprocate if possible[21] and may offer substantial benefits to the person supplicated, like those, for example, that Oidipous offers Theseus (Soph. *OC*, 576–78). However, just as the person supplicated has the power to harm the suppliant by a refusal, so the suppliant also has the power to harm if rejected. All supplication creates a strong obligation, supported by social and religious sanctions. In fact, because the suppliant is protected by Zeus, supplication carries with it an implicit threat to the person supplicated. Once successful, a *hiketês* enters into a reciprocal relationship with the person supplicated, becoming a dependent *philos* or, if the two are social equals, a *xenos*.

These three reciprocal relationships are similar to one another as well as to kinship. The *xenos* in the sense of "stranger" who seeks to be accepted as a *philos* is in many ways indistinguishable from the suppliant,[22] and *xenia* may be initiated by supplication. The marriage relationship can be seen as a particular form of *xenia* and suppliancy, because a wife is a *xenê* who comes to the hearth of her husband as a suppliant.[23] The close connections among all of these relationships are also apparent from the fact that all arouse similar emotions. Violence to a suppliant or *xenos* is as shocking as kin or spouse murder, incest or cannibalism, crimes that tend to go together in Greek thought.[24] Usually, however, *aidôs* ("respect," "reverence") prevents harm to kin, spouse, *xenos*, or suppliant. Even before being formally accepted as a *philos*, a suppliant has *aidôs* for the person supplicated and has strong claims to be treated with *aidôs* in return.[25] This fact has important consequences for an interpretation of suppliant plays. If *aidôs* is characteristic of both *hiketês* and supplicated at the time of supplication, and if, as Gustave Glotz claims, *philoi* are those who are united by a feeling of *aidôs*,[26] then the suppliant is already in some respects like a *philos* even before being fully acknowledged as such. Thus, even before being accepted, a *hiketês* is an outsider who nevertheless has strong claims to be treated as a *philos*. Correspondingly, to accept a suppliant is much like what Aristotle calls "recognition [leading] to [a state of] *philia*": recognition of identity that involves acting as a *philos*.

These similarities between biological kinship and relationships based on reciprocity are strongly emphasized in tragedy. In this genre, harm to distant kin, and to suppliants, *xenoi*, and spouses has a dramatic function similar to

pathê among close blood kin, and the acceptance of outsiders as *philoi* toward whom one has reciprocal obligations is represented as similar to the recognition of the identity of a blood relative that involves acting as a *philos*.

2. *Philia* in Epic

A brief survey of Homer's very different treatment of violation of *philia* can illuminate the distinctive role played in tragedy by *pathê* among *philoi*. Although this discussion is confined to Homer, there are indications in the fragments of the Epic Cycle that Homer's treatment of *pathê* among *philoi* was not exceptional.[27] Although *pathê* are important in epic as well as tragedy, in epic they tend to take place between enemies rather than *philoi*. This may be one reason why, in Aristotle's view, tragedy develops out of and is superior to epic: tragedy has discovered that *pathê* among *philoi* best arouse pity and fear.[28]

Problematic *philia* relationships, of course, are important in epic as well as in tragedy. The Trojan War begins with Paris's violation of *xenia* in Menelaos's house, and the quarrel between Akhilleus and his friend[29] Agamemnon occasions the wrath that is the subject of the *Iliad*. Akhilleus's revenge on Hektor for the death of Patroklos, the friend whom Akhilleus accuses himself of failing to protect, is another central event in the poem. In the *Odyssey*, the marriage relationship between Penelope and Odysseus is threatened by Odysseus's long absence, and proper *xenia* behavior is neglected by the Kyklops and by the suitors in Ithaka.

Epic differs significantly from tragedy, however, in its treatment of these relationships. First, an act of direct, physical harm among blood kin, spouses, *xenoi* or suppliants is not central to epic plots as it is to the plots of most tragedies. Akhilleus's wrath results in harm to the Greeks, and he even asks that they be killed beside the ships (*Il.* 1.410–11). However, Akhilleus in the *Iliad* is not related by blood to Agamemnon or to Patroklos, and his suppliancy relationship with the latter is barely mentioned.[30] Moreover, his role in the death of even unrelated Greek friends is the indirect one of refusing to fight. That the *Iliad* goes out of its way to stress that he commits no act of violence against them is apparent from the scene in *Iliad* 1 in which Athena appears precisely in order to avert physical violence between Agamemnon and Akhilleus. Akhilleus does not curse the Akhaians, as Theseus curses his son in Euripides' *Hippolytus*, nor does he pray directly to Zeus asking him to kill the Akhaians, as happens in *Iliad* 1.37–43 when Khryses prays to Apollo to punish the Akhaians and is immediately answered. Instead, Akhilleus takes a more indirect route, asking Thetis to ask Zeus to aid the Trojans and punish the Akhaians (*Il.* 1.407–10). Zeus's will is carried out in a series of complex actions over the course of many books, so that Akhilleus's responsibility is further diluted in the narrative. Nor is Akhilleus's refusal to fight portrayed as direct

harm to his friends, like murder or betrayal to an enemy. Indeed, his wrath is not blamed by his friends until he refuses the gifts in Book 9 (see 9.515–18, 523), and even after that point, no one holds him personally responsible for the deaths of his friends. Akhilleus blames himself for failing to protect Patroklos and his other friends (18.98–106), but he never suggests that he is a kind of murderer. Those responsible, according to Patroklos himself, are Zeus, Apollo, Euphorbos, and Hektor (16.844–50).

Central to the plot of the *Odyssey* is Odysseus's restoration of order in his troubled household. He both renews his marriage with Penelope, which was threatened in his absence, and kills her suitors. However, Odysseus's marriage is threatened not by Penelope, who is frequently contrasted with the faithless Klytaimestra, but by the suitors, and these men are not *philoi* who betray him, but simply his enemies (see *Po.* 1455b22). Instead of offending against an existing *xenia* relationship with Odysseus, the suitors refuse to enter into any positive reciprocal relationship in the first place, engaging in a purely "negative reciprocity."[31] Far from being his *xenoi*, the suitors have consistently refused to share a table with the disguised Odysseus.[32] One exception proves the rule. Antinoös, whose father fled his own people and was protected as a suppliant by Odysseus, is the only one of the suitors who is guilty of ingratitude to Odysseus as hereditary suppliant or *xenos*. This fact, however, is mentioned in only a single brief passage (16.418–33) and is not alluded to when Antinoös is killed. Yet, an emphasis on Antinoös's violation of *xenia* would have helped to underline his other defects. He is the ringleader of the suitors (17.394–95), and his faults are recounted frequently and at length. He plots the ambush against Telemakhos (4.663–72), advises the suitors to kill the young man in another way when this fails (16.364–92), is the only one of the suitors who does not give food to the disguised Odysseus, and is the first to attack him physically, an act condemned by all the others (17.409–504). Fittingly, he is the first to be killed (22.1–30).

In more minor events also, epic either lacks or fails to emphasize violent events among blood kin or spouses.[33] There is no mention in Homer of a sacrifice of Iphigeneia by her father, and Oidipous continues to rule in Thebes after he discovers that he has committed patricide and incest (*Od.* 11.271–80). The brothers Atreus and Thyestes, notorious enemies in tragedy, appear to be on good terms in Homer (*Il.* 2.106–7).[34] The murder of Agamemnon by Aigisthos (who is not said to be his kin) is mentioned many times in the *Odyssey*, but Klytaimestra's killing of her husband is only rarely alluded to. Usually she is represented as merely helping to plan the murder of Agamemnon.[35] In contrast, it is Klytaimestra who does the deed in Aiskhylos's *Agamemnon* and Aigisthos who helps in the planning (1614, 1627, 1634–35, 1643–46). In the tragedy, moreover, the kinship between Agamemnon and Aigisthos is stressed (*Ag.* 1577–1611). Furthermore, epic society is not centered around large, organized kinship groups, so that there is no kinship between Odysseus and the Ithakans he slaughters.[36] In tragedy, on the other hand, all inhabitants of a polis tend to be seen as kin, so that civil war is a kind of kin murder.[37] In tragedy, even the opposition between Greeks and barbarians may be seen in terms of kinship. As a barbarian, the Trojan Hektor is kin (ἐγγενής: *Rhesos* 404) to the Thracian Rhesos, and the "barbarian race" (γένος) is opposed to that of the Greeks.[38] Epic even avoids violence among friends related by marriage (*Od.* 10.438–42) or unrelated friends: the quarrel between Akhilleus and Odysseus (*Od.* 8.75–77), like that between Akhilleus and Agamemnon, is conducted in words only.

The epic treatment of the suppliant-exile also differs markedly from that of tragedy. The most famous suppliant-exile in tragedy is Oidipous, who seeks asylum in Kolonos after committing patricide and incest (Soph. *OC*). Euripides' Medeia and Herakles also take refuge in Athens after murdering their children, and the supplication and trial of the exiled matricide Orestes is the subject of Aiskhylos's *Eumenides*. In contrast, violence against kin is unimportant in the common epic pattern of the suppliant-exile. Often, the epic *hiketês* is an exile because he has killed someone and flees retribution from the dead person's kin. In his story to Athena (*Od.* 13.259–75), Odysseus claims to be an exile from Crete who fled because he killed the son of Idomeneus and who escaped by supplicating the Phoinikians. In the *Iliad*, Lykophron (15.430–32) and Patroklos (23.85–88) were both exiled because they killed a man. Sometimes the person killed happens to be related to the murderer-exile. Tlepolemos (*Il.* 2.662–63) killed his father's uncle, Medon (*Il.* 13.694–97) killed a kinsman of his stepmother, and Epeigeus (*Il.* 16.571–74) came as suppliant to Peleus and Thetis after killing his cousin. The prophet Theoklymenos fled Argos after killing a "relative" or "fellow tribesman" (ἄνδρα ἔμφυλον: *Od.* 15.271–78). In these cases, however, kin murder is merely mentioned in passing, and does not become an important issue. When two disputants are very closely related, murder is avoided altogether. Phoinix, who, at his mother's urging, slept with his father's mistress, quarreled with his father and was forced to flee his country. Thus, like the typical suppliant-exile, Phoinix fled his own country because of a quarrel, but, unlike the typical exile, he did not actually commit murder. On the contrary, Homer is careful to tell us that he refrained from patricide (*Il.* 9.458–61).[39] In Euripides' *Phoinix*, in contrast, Phoinix is falsely accused and then blinded by his father.

Epic also differs from tragedy in that it does not represent harm to *xenoi* and *hiketai* as similar to harm to blood kin. Although *hiketai* in tragedy are frequently kin, however distant, this is not the case in epic. An epic *hiketês* may be a god in disguise (for instance, *Od.* 17.483–87) but is never suspected of being a distant cousin. The disguised Odysseus invents many stories to engage the sympathy of those he meets, and he tells Penelope that he once entertained Odysseus as a *xenos*; but he never claims to be a relative, as a tragic figure might be expected to do. Indeed, the function of Zeus Hikesios in epic is precisely to care for those who have no other claims to protection: "beggars and suppliants" (for example, *Od.* 6.207–8).

Homer, moreover, tends to portray offenses against *xenia* as refusals to enter into a reciprocal relationship in the first place rather than as betrayals

from within an existing *philia* relationship. While the Kyklops in the *Odyssey* offends against the rules of *xenia* in the most extreme manner possible—by eating his guests—one thing he is not guilty of is betrayal of a *philos*. Actual betrayal within a preexisting *xenia* relationship is either avoided in epic or given much less emphasis than in tragedy. As noted above, the suitors in Ithaka (with one exception) are not Odysseus's *xenoi*. Aigisthos kills Agamemnon after inviting him to a feast at his house, but this incident is passed over in two lines (*Od.* 11.409–11), and the story of Herakles' murder of his guest Iphitos is mentioned only briefly (21.24–30). In the *Iliad*, the Greek Diomedes gets the better of his Trojan *xenos* Glaukos in taking gold for bronze but never considers killing him (6. 212–36). Although Akhilleus kills a suppliant, Lykaon, who claims to have received food from him, this act is not portrayed as a violation of *xenia* or *philia*. Akhilleus had previously spared Lykaon's life only in order to sell him as a slave (*Il.* 21.75–79).[40]

Scenes of supplication in epic also differ significantly from those in tragedy. In epic as in tragedy, Zeus Hikesios punishes those who fail to protect *xenoi* and *hiketai*, and the fear of his anger is explicitly or implicitly appealed to by the suppliant.[41] Tragedy, however, gives a dramatic and emotional emphasis to this fear that is absent from epic. In tragic supplication scenes, acceptance of a suppliant often has very serious consequences—war, for example—and the dilemma faced by the person supplicated is typically emphasized in the dramatic action. In epic, in contrast, the decision is usually swift and without painful consequences.[42] A partial exception underlines this rule. When Thetis supplicates Zeus, asking him to show favor to the Trojans, Zeus briefly hesitates before agreeing, saying that this will cause conflict with Hera (*Il.* 1.517–27). Among the gods, however, such conflict never has serious consequences, but is easily resolved in Zeus's favor, as we are reminded at the end of Book 1. Moreover, references to pollution, absent from epic, add an entirely new dimension to tragic supplication. In tragedy, to harm a suppliant is to pollute and defile (μιαίνειν) the suppliant's wreaths, the gods, and human laws (Eur. *Heracl.* 71, 264; *Supp.* 378). The suicide of a suppliant, especially at an altar or other sacred place of refuge, creates extremely harmful pollution.[43] The threat of pollution in tragedy helps to make harm to a suppliant just as pitiable and terrifying as harm to blood kin. In addition, the emphasis given to supplication scenes in tragedy gives initial hesitation followed by acceptance of a suppliant a dramatic and emotional impact similar to that produced by the recognition and acknowledgment of blood kin that prevents a *pathos* in tragedy.

Two epic examples show particularly clearly how epic supplication differs from the tragic examples discussed below. In *Iliad* 9.502–14, Phoinix supplicates Akhilleus and warns him against rejecting the Litai,[44] daughters of Zeus, lest their father send Atê to punish the transgressor. Neither in this parable, however, nor in Phoinix's subsequent story of the supplication of Meleagros, nor in Akhilleus's reply is there any mention of fear of Zeus. The emphasis is instead on the positive results of yielding: honor and gifts from other people

(*Il.* 9.515–19, 598–99, 602–5). Far from fearing Zeus, Akhilleus replies, "I think that I am honored by the decree of Zeus" (608).

Another important supplication takes place in *Iliad* 24, when Priam asks Akhilleus to give back Hektor's body. The danger to Priam is emphasized in many ways. Zeus himself seeks to allay the old man's very natural fear, by sending Hermes to guide him and by reassuring him (152–58, 181–87). Hekabe fears for her husband's life (201–8), and he is escorted out of Troy by his kin "lamenting much, as if he were going to his death" (327–28). In the actual supplication scene, the danger to Priam is again stressed in the characterization of Akhilleus's hands as "terrible and murderous" (479). Even after the supplication is successful, Akhilleus warns Priam not to push him too far (568–70), and after Priam has gone to sleep in Akhilleus's tent, Hermes wakes the old man and tells him to leave, warning him not to sleep among "enemy men" (682–88). On the other hand, there is little suggestion of any possible danger to Akhilleus from the anger of Zeus Hikesios. True, Akhilleus is ordered to give back Hektor's body by Zeus himself, who is angry with him for his treatment of the dead man (113–16, 134–36), Priam tells Akhilleus to respect the gods (503), and Akhilleus says that he fears offending against the orders of Zeus (570). Nevertheless, the threat to Akhilleus has no significant emotional impact. It is implicit rather than explicitly dramatized, and failure to accept supplication is not represented as a real possibility, considered and debated by Akhilleus. Instead, he agrees immediately, in two lines, to obey Zeus (139–40).

3. *Philia* in Tragedy: Overview

Pathê among *philoi* are of much more central importance in the plots of tragedies than they are in Homer. In arguing for this view, I begin, in this section, with an overview of the different kinds of relationships within which a *pathos* occurs or is about to occur in the major events of the plots of the thirty-two extant tragedies. My groupings of plays according to *pathê* within categories of relationships are based on the broad concept of *philia* and recognition explained in section 1. They are intended not to be rigid or absolute but merely to serve as one convenient way of grouping tragedies with similar plots.

I. In seventeen plays, the central *pathos* is a violent act, actual or threatened, against a *philos* who is a blood relative. In the majority, the *philoi* are parent and child.

   A. Parent harms child in seven plays. In Aiskhylos's *Eumenides*, mother, in the guise of her Furies, torments son. Six plays of Euripides also focus on violence of parent against child. Mother kills child in *Bacchae* and *Medea*, and in *Ion*, mother is about to kill son. Father kills child in *Herakles*, *Iphigenia in Aulis*, and *Hippolytos*.

B. In five plays, child harms parent. In Aiskhylos's *Libation Bearers*, son kills mother, in Sophokles' *Oedipus the King*, son kills father and marries mother, and in the *Elektra* plays of Sophokles and Euripides, children kill mother. The consequences of matricide are the subject of Euripides' *Orestes*. The stage action of this play represents many *pathê* about to take place among kin. Grandfather (Tyndareos) harms grandchildren (Orestes and Elektra) by urging the Argives to punish them. Uncle (Menelaos) harms nephew and niece (Orestes and Elektra) by refusing to protect them. Nephew and niece (Orestes and Elektra) attempt to kill aunt (Helen), and cousins (Orestes and Elektra) threaten to kill cousin (Hermione).

C. Fratricide is the subject of three plays. In Aiskhylos's *Seven Against Thebes* and Euripides' *Phoenician Women*, brother kills brother, and sister is about to kill brother in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*.

D. Harm to other blood kin takes place in two plays. In Aiskhylos's *Prometheus Bound*, Zeus tortures his uncle Prometheus,[45] and in Sophokles' *Antigone*, Kreon condemns his niece Antigone to death.

II. Central to a group of nine plays is a *pathos* among those in reciprocal relationships by means of which outsiders are brought within formal reciprocal *philia* relationships: marriage, *xenia*, and suppliancy.

A. In two plays, Aiskhylos's *Agamemnon* and Sophokles' *Women of Trakhis*, the central *pathos* is the murder of husband by wife.

B. Violation of the *xenia* relationship is central in three plays. In Sophokles' *Philoktetes*, Neoptolemos is about to betray and abandon Philoktetes, his *xenos* and suppliant. In Euripides' *Hekabe*, Polymestor kills his *xenos* Polydoros and is killed in turn by Hekabe while being entertained as a *xenos* by her. In Euripides' *Helen*, Theoklymenos threatens to harm Helen, the hereditary *xenê* who was entrusted to his father by Zeus (see below, section 4). Violation of *xenia* is an important, though not central, issue in other plays. For example, in Aiskhylos's *Libation Bearers* and in Sophokles' *Elektra*, Orestes kills his mother after being received as a *xenos*, and in Euripides' *Elektra* he kills Aigisthos while he is a guest at the latter's feast.[46]

C. In four plays, the central *pathos* that is averted is harm within a suppliancy relationship: Aiskhylos's *Suppliants*, Sophokles' *Oedipus at Kolonos*, and Euripides' *Children of Herakles* and *Suppliants*.[47] Supplication is also a minor event in most of the other extant tragedies.[48]

III. This leaves only six of the extant plays that do not at first appear to have a plot centering on harm to blood kin, *xenos*, spouse, or suppliant: Aiskhylos's *Persians*; Sophokles' *Aias*; and Euripides' *Alkestis*, *Trojan Women*, *Andromakhe*, and the *Rhesos*, attributed to Euripides. Violation of *philia* nevertheless plays an important role even in a number of these plays. Xerxes' defeat in *Persians* is dramatized as an act by which he has harmed his own *philoi*, the Persians; Aias kills himself, his own closest *philos*, and in *Andromakhe*, Neoptolemos injures his *philoi* by bringing a concubine into his house.[49]

According to my interpretation of the plays, then, the central *pathos* occurs among *philoi* in twenty-six of the thirty-two extant tragedies. Only six plays may be classified as exceptional. The table at the beginning of appendix A summarizes the central *pathê* in the tragedies according to the categories of relationships listed above. Harm to blood kin occurs, or is threatened, in seventeen, or 53 percent, of the thirty-two extant tragedies, and harm to people in formal reciprocal relationships occurs in nine plays. This brings the total of plays in which harm to *philoi* occurs to twenty-six, or 81 percent of the total.

Although the evidence for the tragedies that have not survived in complete form is scanty and difficult to evaluate, it points in the same direction as the more complete record for the extant plays. Tables in asppendix B, section 6, and appendix C, section 4, provide summaries. In the fragments of Aiskhylos, Sophokles, and Euripides, harm to blood kin occurs in sixty-nine, or 49 percent, of the 141 plays in which the kind of *pathos* can be determined with some likelihood. Harm to spouses, *xenoi*, or suppliants occurs in an additional thirty-seven plays, raising the total to 106, or 76 percent of the total. The evidence for the fragments of the minor tragedians suggests a similar pattern. Harm to blood kin is likely to have occurred in seventy-four plays, or 53 percent of the 139 plays in which the kind of *pathos* can be determined with some likelihood. Harm within reciprocal relationships occurs in an additional twenty-nine plays, bringing the total to 103, or 74 percent of the total.

4. *Xenia* and Suppliancy in Tragedy

A closer look at some plays in which *pathê* occur among *xenoi* and suppliants will help to justify their inclusion within the same category as tragedies in which harm to blood kin occurs. In tragedy, to a much greater extent than in epic, harm to suppliants and *xenoi* is represented as similar to harm to blood kin. Tragic *hiketai* typically supplicate people who are in fact kin, however distant, and they typically flee violence threatened by their own kin. Unlike epic, tragedy also portrays offenses against *xenoi* as betrayals of an existing *philia* relationship, represented as similar to kinship. Moreover, the tragic supplica-

tion plot as a whole resembles the tragic plot pattern of harm among kin averted by recognition.

Although *hiketai* are complete strangers in epic, in all but one of the four suppliant tragedies, suppliants are related by blood to those whom they supplicate, and they cite this relationship as a basis for their claim to protection. The Danaïds in Aiskhylos's *Suppliants* claim protection from Pelasgos on the basis of kinship, stressing their Argive origin in supplicating the king of Argos (for instance, 274–75). They also claim protection from Zeus Hikesios on the basis of their kinship with him as descendants of his son Epaphos (531–37; cf. "Zeus Forefather" [γεννήτωρ]: 206). In Euripides' *Suppliants*, the Argive women supplicate Theseus on the basis of kinship, since they, like him, belong to the race of Pelasgos (263–64). In addition, Theseus's own mother, Aithra, joins the women as suppliant (32–33, 93), and it is to her personal appeal as their representative that Theseus responds (359–64). In Euripides' *Children of Herakles*, the children supplicate their kin Demophon (207–13, 224, 240). Only in Sophokles' *Oedipus at Kolonos* are the primary suppliant and supplicated (Oidipous and Theseus) not related by blood. Even in this case, however, Theseus's sympathy for Oidipous is increased by the fact that the two men have had a common life as *xenoi* (562–68), and it is noteworthy that Antigone supplicates the Chorus (ἱκετεύομεν: 241), asking them to pity her as if she were kin (245–46). This play also has a minor supplication between kin: Polyneikes supplicates his father Oidipous.

Suppliant-exiles in epic only rarely flee relatives who attempt to harm them. However, this pattern occurs in three of the four suppliant plays. The Danaïds flee harm from their cousins in Aiskhylos's *Suppliants*, and in Euripides' *Children of Herakles*, the children are pursued by Eurystheus, a cousin of their mother, Alkmene. In Sophokles' *Oedipus at Kolonos*, Oidipous is pursued by his uncle, Kreon. Moreover, unlike the typical suppliant-exile of epic, Oidipous has fled his own country because he harmed his closest relatives. In Euripides' *Suppliants*, Adrastos and the Argive women do not flee harm from their own kin; however, their alliance and kinship by marriage with Polyneikes, Adrastos, and the other Argives give them a familial concern in his fratricidal death and in the harm done to him by his kin Kreon, who forbids his burial. All, as the Chorus state, have shared in the fate of Oidipous (1078).

The tragic suppliant plot in all of these plays is similar to the plot pattern of the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, in which harm to kin is averted by recognition. Tragedy, unlike epic, dramatizes the danger of pollution to the person supplicated as well as the danger of physical harm to the suppliant. Those supplicated experience *aidôs* for the suppliant and fear of Zeus Hikesios so strongly that they are willing to risk war in order to protect a suppliant. Their very hesitation is an acknowledgment of the strength of the suppliants' claims and an implicit recognition that the suppliant is already in some respects like a *philos*. To fail to protect a suppliant, we are made to feel, is like harming a *philos*, and to hesitate fully to acknowledge a suppliant is like being about to harm a *philos* who is not yet fully recognized as such. When a suppliant is at last

accepted, this act is dramatically and emotionally similar to the recognition of *philia* that averts harm in plays like the *Iphigenia*.[50] These similarities are, in most cases, heightened by the fact that there is actual blood kinship of a distant kind between suppliant and supplicated.

Aiskhylos's *Suppliants* provides the clearest example of this pattern, as will be seen in detail below in chapter 3. In this play, the dramatic focus is on the relationship between suppliant and supplicated, instead of that between suppliant and pursuer. The altar at which the women supplicate is the center of attention throughout the play, and the action moves from the Danaïds' bad fortune as suppliant-exiles to their good fortune as successful suppliants and accepted residents of Argos. The main threat in the dramatic action represented on stage is that Pelasgos (and Zeus Hikesios) will reject their supplication and hand them over to their enemies. This is the central *pathos*. The danger is twofold: Pelasgos would harm the Danaïds by allowing them to fall prey to their cousins, and they in turn would harm him by arousing the wrath of Zeus and creating pollution.

The act of supplication gives the Danaïds strong claims, recognized by Pelasgos, to be treated as *philai*, and their distant blood kinship with him strengthens these claims. Pelasgos's initial hesitation is a failure fully to acknowledge and recognize these claims by acting as a *philos* and according them protection. In pressing their claims, the Danaïds give proof of their kinship by relating the story of their Argive ancestor, Io (291–324), in a recognition scene very similar to that in the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, in which Orestes gives his sister proof of his identity by recounting family history (806–26).[51] Kinship figures prominently in the final decision of Pelasgos and the Argives, because it helps to create the possibility of the "double pollution" against which Pelasgos warns the Argives (618–19). While Pelasgos's recognition that a relationship of blood kinship exists (325–26) does not, as in the *IT*, lead immediately to full acknowledgment and acceptance of the Danaïds as *philai* who must be protected, it helps to assimilate the threat of harm to suppliants to threat of harm to close blood kin. Aiskhylos also uses explicit threats of suicide made by the Danaïds to increase and dramatize the serious consequences of a rejection. The Danaïds first threaten to go to the underworld to bring charges against Zeus himself, their divine host and kin (154–74). Next, by threatening to hang themselves from the city's altars, the Danaïds threaten Pelasgos with pollution for the entire city that will call down the wrath of Zeus Hikesios (473–79, 615–20). When Pelasgos finally yields to their threat (478–79), he fully acknowledges *philia* (that is, a recognition leading to a state of *philia* occurs) by acting as *philos* and giving them protection. Danaos explicitly appeals to Pelasgos's recent acknowledgment of himself and his daughters as *philoi* in the speech in which he requests an escort to protect him from possible harm by the citizens: "For before now someone has killed a *philos* because of ignorance" (καὶ δὴ φίλον τις ἔκταν' ἀγνοίας ὕπο: 499). In *Suppliants*, as in the *Iphigenia*, harming a *philos* in ignorance is averted by recognition and acknowledgment of *philia*.

In the three tragedies that focus on *xenia*, harm to *xenoi* is represented as the violation of an existing reciprocal relationship. In tragedy, in contrast to epic, a reciprocal relationship is first established, and then betrayal either occurs or is averted by recognition and acknowledgment of *philia*.

In Sophokles' *Philoktetes*, the *xenia* relationship plays an essential role in the interactions of Neoptolemos and Philoktetes, as I argue in detail in chapter 4. In acquiring Philoktetes' bow, Neoptolemos completes with the older man many of the acts that initiate *xenia*. If Neoptolemos fails to return the bow, as he at first threatens to do, he will in effect injure a *xenos* and declare hostilities with him by refusing to reciprocate in the exchange. When Neoptolemos at last keeps his promise to Philoktetes, he recognizes and acknowledges the older man as a *philos* by acting as a *xenos*. The assimilation of *xenia* to blood kinship in this plot is evidenced by Sophokles' representation of the relationship between the two men as similar to that between father and son. Philoktetes' friendly feelings toward Neoptolemos are in large part due to his previous friendship with Akhilleus. Although we are not told in this play that Akhilleus and Philoktetes were *xenoi*, this is certainly possible, especially since Philoktetes acts like a *xenos* in treating Akhilleus's son as his own child. He calls the young man "the son of the dearest father" (242) and addresses him as though he were his own son.[52] This assimilation of *xenia* to kinship helps to make Neoptolemos's acknowledgment of Philoktetes as a *xenos* dramatically and emotionally similar to a recognition between blood kin that averts a *pathos*.

Euripides' *Hekabe* represents betrayals of *xenia* that actually take place. Hekabe suffers as a slave after the Trojan War, which was caused by Paris (629–56, 943–51), who violated his *xenia* relationship with Menelaos. When she discovers Polydoros's corpse and realizes that her *xenos* Polymestor has killed her son (681–720), a recognition thereby occurs that a *philos* has acted as an enemy (recognition leading to a state of enmity). Hekabe persuades Agamemnon to allow her to punish Polymestor, "the most impious of *xenoi*" who did "the most impious deed" (790–92). She takes an appropriately reciprocal revenge on Polymestor by pretending to receive him as a *xenos*. She lures him to her tent and appears to treat him as a friend (ὡς δὴ παρὰ φίλῳ: 1152). Instead of wine, however, Hekabe offers Polymestor blood, killing his sons and blinding him.

In Euripides' *Helen*, the relationships among Zeus, Proteus, and Helen are much the same as those among Priam, Polymestor, and Polydoros in the *Hekabe*.[53] Zeus gave Helen to Proteus, king of Egypt, to keep her safe for her husband while he was away at Troy fighting to regain the phantom Helen (44–48, 909–11, 964). This *xenia* relationship between Helen and Proteus has been inherited by Proteus's son Theoklymenos, who, however, attempts to violate it by forcing Helen to marry him.

This brief survey has introduced evidence that tragedy, in contrast to epic, is characterized by its focus on harm among *philoi*. Kin murders and violations

of formal reciprocal relationships are notably either absent from epic or, if mentioned, are little emphasized. On the other hand, violation of *philia* is an important element in most of the extant tragedies. To judge from them, violation of *philia* occurs not only in those tragedies Aristotle calls "best"; rather, it can also can be said to be a defining characteristic of tragedy as a whole. More detailed support for this view will be given in later chapters.

Appendix to Chapter 1: David Konstan on *Philos* and *Philia*

I have followed common practice in translating the word *philia* as "kinship" or "friendship" and the word *philos* as "kin" or "friend." However, since the traditional interpretation of these terms has recently been challenged by David Konstan, this practice requires some justification.[54] Konstan argues that the Greek term *philos* "designates a party to a voluntary bond of affection and good will, and normally excludes both close kin and more distant acquaintances" (1997, 53). He holds that in the classical period and later, the noun *philos* (usually with the article) has a restricted sense, referring to a friend who is not a relative, while the abstract noun *philia* and the adjective *philos* (without the article) have a wider range and can also be used to refer to kin.[55] Konstan also disagrees with the view of most scholars that *philia* refers to objective obligations, arguing instead that it "refers to friendly actions or treatment, whether of friends who behave attentively or of kin whose feelings and conduct are appropriately warm and loyal" (1996, 89).

Konstan has done a great service in reopening the question of the meaning of these important terms, in calling attention to their wide range and frequent ambiguity, in demonstrating that *philos* often means "friend" or "dear," and in showing that *philia* often refers to "affectionate sentiments" and not merely to "objective obligations"(1996, 71). He has also amassed a wealth of evidence that will be of great use to future scholars, and he has presented it with admirable fairness, taking into account exceptions and cases that are problematic for his interpretation.[56] Nevertheless, his arguments are not entirely convincing.[57] In the first place, although *philia* can indeed refer to affectionate sentiments, Konstan's account does not give sufficient emphasis to the objective obligations that *philia* relationships entail. In ancient Greece, more than in most modern societies, people in close relationships have ethical and legal obligations to help one another, although they may also be motivated by affection to fulfill these obligations. Moreover, Konstan's thesis that the term *philos* "normally excludes . . . close kin" either fails to take important passages into account or requires some very strained interpretations.

One important passage not discussed by Konstan is *Poetics* 14. Here, as noted in section 1, Aristotle begins by dividing human relationships into three exhaustive categories: *philoi*, enemies, and neutrals (1453b15–16). He then states that in the best plots terrible deeds take place within *philia* relationships,

citing relationships within the nuclear family. Aristotle goes on to give examples of plays in which blood kin harm or are about to harm blood kin. For example, Sophokles' Oidipous does the terrible deeds and only later happens "to recognize *philia*" (1453b29–31), that is, he recognizes that he has killed his father and married his mother. In *Poetics* 14, then, the noun *philos* surely has the same range as *philia*, and both refer primarily, if not exclusively, to relationships among close blood kin. Aristotle also uses *philos* (with the article) in the sense of "kin" at *NE* 8.12.1162a31–32: "[Justice] does not appear to be the same for a *philos* to a *philos* [τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον], and to an outsider, and to a companion, and to a schoolmate." Here, the contrast between *philos* and companion (*hetairos*) clearly indicates that the word must mean "kin."[58]

In a number of passages in tragedy also, it is very difficult not to give *philos* (with or without the article) the sense of "kin."[59] For example, in Aiskhylos's *Seven Against Thebes* 971, the fratricide is lamented: "You perished at the hands of a *philos*, and you killed a *philos*" (πρὸς φίλου ἔφθισο. καὶ φίλον ἔκτανες).[60] When the Erinyes say that they punish the murderer of the *philos* within the house (Ais. *Eum.* 354–59), the word must refer to blood kin,[61] especially since they later explain their failure to punish Klytaimestra by saying that she was not guilty of killing someone related by blood (604–5). In Euripides' *Elektra* 1230, Elektra says of the mother she and her brother have just killed, "*Phila* and not *phila*" (φίλᾳ τε κοὐ φίλᾳ). Konstan's interpretation—"Though dear as a mother, Clytemnestra is an enemy"— is hardly the most natural; since the play has continually emphasized Elektra's hatred, the only way in which Klytaimestra is *phila* to her is by virtue of kinship.[62] A frequently cited example of *philos* in the sense of "kin" is Euripides' *Phoenician Women* 1446, where the dying Polyneikes says of his dead brother, "*Philos*, he became an enemy, but was still *philos*" (φίλος γὰρ ἐχθρὸς ἐγένετ', ἀλλ' ὅμως φίλος).[63] Konstan also denies that *philos* can mean "kin" in Sophokles' *Antigone* (1996, 89–91). However, his claim (1996, 91) that "the issue of his [sc. Kreon's] relationship to Polyneices is never raised" in this play misses an important irony. Just before Kreon redefines *philos* to exclude kin, and proclaims his decree against burying Polyneikes, he states that he holds the rule in Thebes because he is next of kin to Oidipous's dead sons (ἐγὼ κράτη δὴ πάντα καὶ θρόνους ἔχω / γένους κατ' ἀγχιστεῖα τῶν ὀλωλότων: 173–74). Kreon's power to deny Polyneikes the obligations due to kin depends, ironically, on his kinship relationship with the young man. Moreover, Kreon's emphasis on this relationship at the beginning of his speech ensures that the audience will be aware of the sense of "kin" that Kreon excludes when he subsequently speaks of counting people as *philoi* or of making *philoi* (182–90). For all of these reasons I continue to translate *philos* as "kin" or "friend" and *philia* as "kinship" or "friendship."

2

Averting Fratricide: Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*

In the background of the play's action but kept always in the foreground of attention is the sacrifice at Aulis. Iphigeneia is thought to have been sacrificed by her father Agamemnon at Aulis, at the command of Artemis. She was, however, secretly rescued by Artemis and brought to the Taurian land, where she was made the priestess of rites in which *xenoi* are sacrificed to the goddess. When the play opens, Iphigeneia, having just had a dream which she interprets to mean that Orestes is dead, mourns for her brother. Orestes, however, is still alive and has just arrived in the Taurian land with his cousin and brother-in-law Pylades. After killing his mother, Klytaimestra, in obedience to Apollo's oracle, Orestes received a second oracle from the god, telling him that he would find release from his mother's Erinyes by taking Artemis's statue from the Taurian land to Athens. When Orestes has an attack of madness caused by Klytaimestra's Erinyes, he and Pylades are captured by the Taurians and brought for sacrifice to Iphigeneia.

The priestess learns that the young men are from Argos and agrees to help one of them escape if he will take a letter to her friends in that land. While she goes to get the letter, each of the young men offers his life for the other. They finally agree that Orestes will die while Pylades will carry on the family name as husband of Orestes' sister Elektra. When the priestess returns to give Pylades the letter, she reveals that she is Iphigeneia. Orestes joyfully recognizes and embraces his sister, and, after he correctly answers questions about their family, Iphigeneia also recognizes her brother and rejoices with him.

The siblings then plan their escape. Iphigeneia tells Thoas, king of the Taurians, that the young men are matricides, who must be purified in the sea along with Artemis's statue, which their presence has polluted. Pretending to conduct secret purification rites, the three put to sea in Orestes' ship, taking the statue with them. They almost escape, but a wave pushes the ship back to

Notes

Introduction

1. The Greek word *philia* can mean either "kinship" or "friendship." For this and other words often left untranslated, see the glossary.

2. Blundell 1989. *Philia* in the plot: Else 1957, 349–52, 391–98, 414–15; Gudeman 1934, 257–58; Vickers 1973, 63, 230–43. *Philia* in other aspects of tragedy: Goldhill 1986, 79–106; Schmidt-Berger 1973; Scully 1973; Seaford 1990, 1994a; Simon 1988.

3. Seaford 1993, 1994a.

4. E.g., Gudeman 1934, 257–58; Else 1957, 391–98.

Chapter 1

1. On *pathos* and recognition, see further Belfiore 1992a, 134–41, 153–60.

2. Aristotle's examples are given at *Po.* 14.1453b19–22, quoted above. Else discusses *philia* in 1957, 349–52, 391–98, 414–15. See also Belfiore 1992a 72–73.

3. Nothing else is known about the author or plot of this play. Cf. Soph. *Phil.* 1386: "You who want to hand me over to my enemies" (ὅς γε τοῖς ἐχθροῖσί μ' ἐκδοῦναι θέλεις).

4. Lacey 1968, 28; Patterson 1998, 83 (fig. 1), 88–89. Littman 1979, 6 n. 2, argues that the children of children of cousins are included.

5. On the breadth of the concept of *philia* in Aristotle and elsewhere in Greek literature, see Millet 1991, 109–26.

6. Cf. *EE* 1242a1–2. The number of categories and their interrelationships are disputed; I follow Gauthier and Jolif 1970, 2.2, 706–7. On the inclusion of the marriage relationship within the category of kinship *philia*, see Gauthier and Jolif on 1162a16, and note that in *Pol.* 1262a10–11 kinship (συγγένεια) includes both blood kinship and relationship by marriage.

7. Gould 1973, 93. On suppliancy, *xenia*, and kinship, see also Herman 1987.

8. For the central role of reciprocity in *philia* among both kin and non-kin in Greek thought, see Millett 1991, 109–59; Mitchell 1997a, 8–9.

9. The combination of biological and social features in Aristotle's discussions of kinship is analyzed by Price 1989, 164–67; Sherman 1989, 148–51. On the idea that recognition in tragedy involves acknowledgment of a social role, see Simon 1988, 50–51; Belfiore 1992a, 157–60. In Eur. *Heracl.*, Iolaos first demonstrates that the children of Herakles are related to Demophon (207–13) and then urges the king to "become kin and friend" (γενοῦ . . . συγγενής, γενοῦ φίλος, 229). When Demophon shows his willingness to act as kin and friend, Iolaos says, "We have found friends and kin" (ηὕρομεν φίλους καὶ ξυγγενεῖς, 304–5). For a similar view of recognition in Homer, see Goldhill 1991a, 5–6; Murnaghan 1987, esp. 5–6, 22–5. See also Demosthenes 23.56 (*Against Aristokrates*), discussed by Blundell 1989, 38. Konstan (1996 and 1997) provides many useful examples of *philos* in the sense of someone who acts as a friend, although I disagree with him about the meaning of the Greek term: see appendix to chapter 1.

10. On ἀθνεία in Eur. *Alc.* (e.g., 646, 810), see Rehm 1994, 92–93. The bride's continuing ties to her natal family have important legal aspects in the classical period (Hunter 1994, 13–15) and frequently give rise to conflicts in tragedy (Seaford 1990).

11. See Donlan 1982, 145–48; Littman 1979, 15–17.

12. On *amphimêtores* and amphimetric disputes, see Ogden 1996, 19–21, 189–99, who notes, "The structure that above all sowed discord in Greek families was the amphimetric one, i.e. that in which a man kept two women . . . and fathered lines of children from both" (189).

13. Seaford 1990, 168–71.

14. Gould 1973, 93, citing *Od.* 8.546–47 and Hesiod, *Op.* 327–34.

15. See Herman 1987, esp. 41–72.

16. On the distinction between the ritualized friend and the temporary guest, see Donlan 1989, 7.

17. *Il.* 7.287–305. See Herman 1989, 60 n. 56.

18. *Pace* Lateiner 1995, 38–39.

19. Herman 1987, 16–29.

20. Schwartz 1985, 487, 495 (cited by Janko 1992, note on *Il.* 13.624–25), argues that Greek ξεν- words are derived from the Indo-European root meaning "to give in exchange or reciprocity, to requite." See also Smith 1993, 18 n. 5.

21. See Gould 1973, 92–93, citing *Od.* 16.422–23. See also Eur. *Heracl.* 503–6.

22. On the distinction, see Gould 1973, 92–94; Roth 1993, 7 n. 15.

23. See below, chapter 3, section 4.

24. Isokrates, *Panathenaikos* 122, links murder of *xenoi* with murder of parents and brothers, incest and cannibalism. (This passage is quoted by Herman 1987, 124, but incorrectly cited.) For other examples of the association of incest with cannibalism, see Moreau 1979; Seaford 1993, 138 n. 102.

25. In Ais. *Supp.*, Zeus Hikesios is called Zeus Aidoios. On *aidôs* and supplication, see Cairns 1993, 183–85, 189–93, 221–27, 276–87; Glotz 1904, 138–42; Gould 1973, 85–90.

26. Glotz 1904, 138.

27. The evidence is surveyed by Seaford 1994a, 360–62.

28. *Pathê* in epic: *Po.* 1459b7–15; tragedy develops from and is superior to epic: *Po.* 4 and 26; best *pathê*: *Po.* 14. See further Belfiore 1992a, 137–38. Jong 1987, 98, notes that the *Iliad* arouses admiration and sometimes fear, rather than the "pity and fear" aroused by tragedy.

29. Agamemnon is included among Akhilleus's "dear companions" (φίλων ἑταίρων) at *Il.* 19.305.

30. Akhilleus was a cousin of Patroklos, according to Hesiod, *Catalogue of Women*, frag. 212aMW: Eustathius, Hom. 112.44ff. In *Il.* 23.84–90, Patroklos is said to be a suppliant-exile, brought up with Akhilleus in Peleus's house after killing a man in his own country. This relationship, however, is mentioned only in this passage, in which Patroklos's ghost asks for burial. Contrast Ais. *Myrmidones* (see below, appendix B).

31. Lateiner 1993, 182. He also notes, "The suitors . . . usurp social status as *xeinoi*" (181), and "[t]he suitors have purposely neglected the obligation and privilege to reciprocate to men and gods" (182). Cf. Lateiner 1995, 220–21.

32. Thus, Odysseus is not guilty of killing his own guests, *pace* Nagler 1993, esp. 244.

33. This fact is noted by Garvie 1986, x–xi; Griffin 1977, 44; Olson 1995, 161–83; Seaford 1989, 87, with n. 1, 1993, 142–46, 1994, 11–13; Simon 1988, esp. 1–2, 13–26. Seaford 1994a, 11, lists six people in addition to Klytaimestra who kill kin in Homer: Tlepolemos (*Il.* 2.662), Medon (*Il.* 15.336), Epeigeus (*Il.* 16.573), Oidipous (*Od.* 11.273), Aedon (*Od.* 19.552), and Meleagros (*Il.* 9.567). To these, add two cases in which a woman is bribed to lead a man to his death: Eriphyle, responsible for the death of her husband Amphiaraos (*Od.* 11.326–27, 15. 244–47), and Astyokhe, who betrays her son Eurypylos (*Od.* 11.520–21).

34. Noted by Kirk, 1985, on 101–8.

35. Aigisthos is implicated in the murder of Agamemnon in *Od.* 1.36, 1.298–30, 3.193–98, 3.234–35, 3.248–50, 3.261–75, 3.303–10, 4.91–92, 4.518–37, 11.387–89, 11.409–39, 24.19–22, 24.96–97. Klytaimestra helps in the planning in 3.234–35, 4.91–92, 11.429–30, 11.439. Klytaimestra kills Agamemnon in 11.409–11, 11.453, 24.96–97, 24.199–200.

36. Roussel 1976, 27–34, notes the absence in Homer of large, organized kinship groups.

37. See Saïd 1983 for this idea in Ais. *Eum.*

38. Eur. *Hec.* 1200; cf. *Andr.* 173, 665; Ais. *Pers.* 434. Hall 1989, 161, argues that tragedy presupposes a generic bond between all Greeks and between all non-Greeks. Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 5.470c.

39. On these lines, alleged by Plutarch to have been deleted by Aristarkhos, see Hainsworth 1993, ad loc., and Janko 1992, 25–29.

40. Gould 1973, 79 n. 35, 80–81, followed by Richardson 1993, on 21.74–96, sees the food presented to Lykaon as an act of hospitality and sharing a meal. Akhilleus, however, has not shared food with Lykaon as a host but merely given food as master to slave. Lykaon uses the deliberately ambiguous phrase πὰρ . . . σοὶ . . . πασάμην (76), which, unlike a reference to the "table of *xenia*," does not necessarily imply sharing. On Lykaon's specious arguments, see Parker 1983, 181–82; Yamagata 1994, 42–44.

41. Examples: Ais. *Supp.* 359–60, 385; *Od.* 9.270–71. The view (held by, e.g., Pedrick 1982) that Zeus does not play the same role as protector of suppliants in the *Iliad* that he does in the *Odyssey* ignores both the *Litai* speech in *Il.* 9.502–12, well explained by Thornton 1984, and Priam's request to Akhilleus to have *aidôs* for the gods (*Il.* 24.503).

42. The Kyklops is punished by Odysseus for his abuse of suppliants, but he is not represented as making an agonizing decision, and he says that he has no fear of Zeus (*Od.* 9.273–78).

43. On these issues, see Delcourt 1939; Gould 1973, 100; Parker 1983, 9, 146–47. Parker notes a number of differences between Homeric and classical supplication (81–88), although he attaches less importance than many to the absence of "pollution" terminology in Homer (130–43).

44. These are "supplications," not "prayers," as Thornton 1984 points out. See also Hainsworth 1993, on 9.501.

45. On the genealogy in Aiskhylos, see below, appendix A.

46. According to the biology of Ais. *Eum.* 658–61, Orestes really is a *xenos* rather than blood kin of his mother.

47. I follow Burian 1971, 1, and Lattimore 1958, 13 n. 2, in categorizing these four as suppliant plays.

48. Mercier's 1990 table of contents lists supplications in all of the plays of Euripides except *Rhes.*, *Alc.*, and *Bacch.*, to which I would add *Bacch.* 1117–21, where Pentheus supplicates Agave. In Ais. *Eum.* (40–45, 91–92, 232, 439–41, 474), Orestes appears as a suppliant, and the Chorus supplicate the gods in the Parodos of *Sept.* (110–11). Supplications also occur in Soph. *Aj.* 1171–84, *OT* (Prologue), and *Phil.* 484–506.

49. For details, see below, chapters 5 and 6, and appendix A.

50. Kopperschmidt 1967, 52, notes a more specific pattern of recognition in suppliant plays, in which an apparent enemy is recognized as savior or vice versa.

51. See also Froidefond 1971, 87: "a real recognition scene." Jones 1999, 24, cites a parallel in Herod. 2.91, where Perseus is said to have "recognized" (ἀναγνῶναι) his kin in Egypt.

52. Avery 1965, 285, notes that Philoktetes uses two words that mean "child," τέκνον and παῖς, fifty-two times in this play.

53. I owe this interpretation of the *Helen* to Mikalson 1991, 78, 261 n. 48.

54. Konstan 1996, 1997. I am indebted to Konstan for making a draft of the latter available to me prior to publication and for helpful discussion of this topic, on which we have agreed to disagree.

55. Konstan 1996, 75–78; 1997, 55–56.

56. For example, 1996, 73–74, 76 n.13, 85, and n. 35.

57. Konstan's views have recently been challenged by Mitchell 1997b.

58. Noted by Gauthier and Jolif 1970, ad loc. Konstan's view (1996, 77–78) that Aristotle is distinguishing friends from companions is implausible in view of the fact that most of 8.12 is devoted to kinship *philia*.

59. See also the problematic cases noted by Konstan 1996, 85n. 35.

60. West 1990 attributes these lines to the Chorus, although the MSS give them to Antigone and Ismene.

61. Sommerstein 1989, on 355–56.

62. Konstan 1997, 62–63. His own earlier interpretation—"kin but not kind"—is much preferable: Konstan 1985, 181.

63. The passage is cited by Dirlmeier 1931, 11; Millet 1991, 287 n. 2, citing Cooper 1980, 334n. 2.

Chapter 2

1. Cf. Hartigan 1986, 120.

2. At 390, the generalizing τὸν θεὸν (L) is preferable to τὴν (the emendation attributed in Diggle's apparatus to "the friend of Markland") read by Diggle and G. Murray, which would refer specifically to Artemis.

Murder Among Friends

Violation of Philia *in Greek Tragedy*

ELIZABETH S. BELFIORE

New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
2000